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MINIMALISM, PERFECTIONISM, AND COMMON
LAW CONSTITUTIONALISM: REFLECTIONS ON
SUNSTEIN'S AND FLEMING'S EFFORTS TO FIND
THE SWEET SPOT IN CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY
Benjamin C. Zipursky*
INTRODUCTION

It has been a great pleasure to read and to comment upon two fine books
in constitutional theory-Cass Sunstein's Radicals in Robes I and Jim
Fleming's Securing Constitutional Democracy.2 Professor Sunstein, as
exemplified in this important new book, epitomizes what most of us think
of as the great law professor-a searing intellect, a penchant for public
engagement, a capacity to opine wisely on important legal, moral, and
political issues while at the same time offering legal theories that are both
imaginative and learned. My good friend Jim Fleming exemplifies those
very same qualities in Securing Constitutional Democracy. As a friend,
colleague, and coauthor, I am familiar with many other important roles he
has played. Three deserve special mention here: builder of Fordham Law
School as an important home of a diverse and cutting-edge array of
constitutional theorists; constant nurturer of and inspiration to junior (and
not-so-junior) colleagues; and personal interlocutor with many of us on the
toughest issues of jurisprudence and constitutional theory. I want to thank
Professor Sunstein for participating in this special symposium; I want to
thank Professor Fleming for being here as a constant presence.
Like many philosophical thinkers, both Sunstein and Fleming are
attracted to a dialectical method that orients the reader through the
presentation of two unacceptable options whose juxtaposition sounds a call
for a third way, a synthesis, a middle path, the sweet spot, or whatever postHegelian metaphor one likes. Sunstein gives us the fundamentalist and the
* Professor and James H. Quinn Chair in Legal Ethics, Fordham Law School. I am grateful

to the participants in this Symposium, and in particular to Cass Sunstein and Jim Fleming,
whose books and appearance made this possible. Fordham Law School's support is
gratefully acknowledged. Finally, I thank John Goldberg and Abner Greene for valuable

comments.
1. Cass R. Sunstein, Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme Right-Wing Courts Are Wrong
for America (2005).
2. James E. Fleming, Securing Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Autonomy
(2006).
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perfectionist, and shows us the golden mean of the minimalist. Fleming
points out the positivist and the no-holds-barred natural law perfectionist,
and then trots out the constitutional constructivist as the middle path. I will
confess at the outset-and mention briefly at the end-that I am no
different. We see the super-cautious and antitheoretical minimalist in
Sunstein, and the bold Rawlsian constitutional constructivist in Fleming.
My question, in a few concluding remarks, is whether we might not find a
middle path in a common law constitutionalism.
I. SUNSTEIN'S MINIMALISM

Sunstein's book is a critique of fundamentalism, a view adhered to by a
cluster of Justices, judges, and scholars with a particular conservative
agenda for the Supreme Court and the courts more generally. The principal
shortcoming of Sunstein's book as a work of constitutional theory is that
the minimalism that Sunstein puts forward as a basis for the critique of
fundamentalism fails to engage fundamentalism in two of the ways that one
hopes it would.
First, the defects of fundamentalism are largely
independent of the merits of minimalism. Second, what characterizes
fundamentalism as a constitutional theory is a set of commitments that
minimalism does not even address, let alone criticize or replace. Each of
these concerns requires a bit of explanation.
A. The Defects of Fundamentalism
Sunstein has so many things to say about the shortcomings of
fundamentalism that it is hard for him to know where to begin. The most
serious, however, is that the core positions of fundamentalists are simply
inconsistent with their alleged commitment to original understanding. In
other words, says Sunstein, some fundamentalists are "false
fundamentalists." 3 Perhaps the best example of this is affirmative action.
There is simply no evidence that affirmative action is inconsistent with
original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause and, indeed, there is
considerable evidence to the contrary. 4 The critique of national security
fundamentalism runs along similar lines: "Here, as with affirmative action,
many fundamentalists do not follow their own creed."'5 More broadly,
fundamentalists' views on separation of powers and the non-delegation
doctrine in particular are unsupported by their own methodology. 6 And the
list goes on and on of pivotally important planks of the fundamentalists'
theoretical platform (for example, gun control, campaign finance, and
commercial speech libertarianism) that must be torn off if one takes
seriously their claim to be committed to original understanding as revealed
through text and history.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Sunstein, supra note 1, at 134 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 138-42.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 204-06.

2007]

NEITHER MINIMALISM NOR PERFECTIONISM

2999

These are important points to which I neither could nor wish to offer
responses. But they are points that have little or nothing to do with the
merits of minimalism. One does not need to be any kind of minimalist to
see that there is a problem with failing to apply one's own methods in an
accurate, or even plausible way. In an important sense, they do not have all
that much to do with Sunstein's title theme: Basing one's normative claims
on unsound arguments and being radical in following one's political goals
are quite different shortcomings. Indeed, a different sort of view than
minimalism-the form of original understanding that the fundamentalists
themselves espouse-would be sufficient to accommodate Sunstein's
criticisms on all of these points. There is really nothing here to support
minimalism.
On most of the other issues Sunstein addresses-those regarding privacy,
the establishment of religions, and the power of Congress to pass
environmental laws and antidiscrimination laws, for example-quite a
different kind of argument emerges. Of course, it is not that Sunstein
concedes the argument from text and history on these points (although he is
commendably willing to recognize weaknesses as to some of them). It is
that he identifies a kind of reason for rejecting the fundamentalists' position
that goes beyond their inconsistency. In a subsection entitled "Why
Fundamentalism is Indefensible," 7 Sunstein offers the simple answer:
Fundamentalism would produce "bad results." "Is it unacceptably 'resultoriented' to object to fundamentalism on the ground that it would lead to
intolerable consequences? Actually it isn't. Any approach to interpretation
has to be defended, not just celebrated, and if an approach would produce
'8
intolerable results, it is hard to defend."
A sharp example is provided by Sunstein's discussion of the
Establishment Clause. 9 Sunstein describes Justice Clarence Thomas's
position that a state can select a particular religion that it wishes to favor
and do so officially within the state. The First Amendment's Establishment
Clause was in particular intended to forbid the federal government from
doing so, but to permit the states to do so. Sunstein writes, "This view is
not implausible as a matter of history, but it would produce radical changes
in American law and life."' 10 And that, for him, seems to be the end of the
matter. He also argues that there is a similar line of argument with regard to
rights of privacy, and with regard to the existence of the regulatory state
(although here, there is a bit less credence given to the cogency of the
interpretive argument).
Certainly, minimalism seems more relevant to the rejection of these
positions. For these are, at a practical level, radical proposals, and
minimalism is both not radical and not in favor of large changes. The

7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 71-73.
Id. at 72-73.
Id. at 223-27.
Id. at 225.
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problem is that the argument seems to beg the question. The argument that
we can simply reject these conclusions because we view them as having
intolerable results is an argument that moves too quickly to invite judges to
interpret the law based on which set of results they like. Many thinkersincluding the fundamentalists--do not think the results would be bad. They
think such results would be good. So even assuming that Sunstein is right
that results should be taken into account, it is not clear why a
fundamentalist should regard the argument as presenting a sound minimalist
critique of their position.
B. The TheoreticalCore of Fundamentalism
Someone who picks up Radicals in Robes will quickly be convinced of
one of the implicit claims of its title: that the fundamentalist agenda is an
agenda for radical change. But there is another implicit claim, which is that
the sort of radicalism advanced by the fundamentalists is inconsistent with
their role as judges. The jarringness of the title, "Radicals In Robes," is not
alliteration for its own sake. The point is almost to suggest a kind of
misrepresentation through the image of radicals hiding under judicial
"robes." But this second sort of claim about radicalism only works as a
criticism if the case is made that the sense in which Justices would be
pursuing major changes involves a sort of change that is inconsistent with a
judge's proper role in constitutional law. After all, Justices Antonin Scalia
and Clarence Thomas do not often hide from their own important stations
and from their agenda to move certain issues from the U.S. Supreme Court.
The problem is particularly acute if one believes that they are basically right
on some of these issues about what the Constitution actually means. If this
is so, then the radicalism of the Roe Court, for example, was twofold: First,
it was a large change precipitated by a bold interpretive step; and second,
the change made was beyond the proper power of a Justice-it was a
usurpation of a power allocated by our system to states. The radicalism of
the fundamentalists, assuming they are radicals and assuming that they are
right about how the Constitution is best interpreted on abortion, for
example, is different for they are applying what the Constitution should be
understood to say. The radicalism of ignoring stare decisis on a mistake is a
different type of thing from the radicalism of taking a misinterpretation of
the Constitution, selected only because it supports one's political agenda, to
authorize great change.
So let us focus on what Sunstein has to say about the form of originalism
that the fundamentalists adopt, and let us put aside questions about their
inconsistency in applying it and their exaggerations about its clarity of
application. Let us ask the question of whether fundamentalists' claim to
have the correct interpretation of various parts of the Constitution is
plausible where their evidence about original understanding is stronger,
rather than weaker.
The question can be put even more sharply.
What minimalism
principally involves as an affirmative matter is a story about the virtues of
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incrementalism, the risks of any full throttle pursuit of a judicial agenda, the
values of stare decisis, and the value of giving time and space to difficult
social problems so that other institutional forces better suited to producing
broad answers can develop some approach over time. However persuasive
these points may be-which I think they frequently are-they are points in
the normative methodology of adjudication. This dimension often runs
perpendicular to the dimension of asking what the most plausible
understanding of the Constitution's meaning is. They relate, in significant
part, to determinations about how deferential or restrained or aggressive the
Court should be in various scenarios, how quickly the Court should move
given what it regards as a sound interpretation of pieces of constitutional
text, how much respect should be paid to precedent, and so forth. This is a
normative theory about how to fashion a plausible approach to decision
making, not to meaning. And so the question is, does Sunstein have
anything to say about the theoretical core of the fundamentalists' position
about meaning?
What Sunstein offers on this question is simply a remarkably pragmatic
approach to interpretation:
Fundamentalists get a lot of rhetorical mileage out of the claim that
their approach is neutral while other approaches are simply a matter of
"politics." But there is nothing neutral in fundamentalism. It is a political
choice, which must be defended on political grounds. If it produces a far
worse system of constitutional law, that must count as a strong point
against it. Il
At bottom, there is thus a theoretical assertion that we all must be
pragmatists in the end. Obviously, one wants more of an argument for this
claim. But we have seen that this makes the debate turn on whether one
regards the results as being too bad. I have trouble seeing why this does not
beg the question-we are turning to constitutional law because we have
different views of whether certain results are desirable or undesirable.
Let me add here a slight nuance. It may be that all grand questions like
this one push the interlocutors to this kind of juncture, and that the
theorist's job is not to come up with a knockdown answer, but rather to
frame difficult decisions in a way that is irresistibly compelling. I believe
that Sunstein has reached such a point in his book at some important places,
for example, when he notes that Thomas would permit states to establish
churches. Here, the argument is helpfully depicted as follows: (1) This
proposal (e.g., permitting states to establish churches) is a completely
unacceptable idea; (2) courts should block it on constitutional grounds; (3)
we know (1) and (2) just by knowing that it is an impossibly radical idea to
permit such a practice (e.g., establishment); (4) (1) through (3) show that
judgment about what we as a society can live with is, at the end of the day,
the touchstone of what is acceptable in constitutional interpretation, not any
particular theory.
11. Id. at 72.
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The problem is that even if one accepts the argument, so framed, it leaves
open, in an unhelpful way, a wide range of other issues that look somewhat
similar, but as to which (1) through (3) do not work rhetorically for large
and reasonable audiences. This is so, in my view, with respect to whether
Roe 12 and Casey13 should be overruled: Even assuming that the claim that
they should be overruled is a radical claim, it is not one of those claims that
is simply off-the-map conversationally. One gets the sense, in reading
Radicals in Robes, that we are supposed to regard fundamentalism as
largely a combination of the false fundamentalist affirmative action type of
claims and the off-the-map Establishment Clause claims. I do not think
Sunstein has established this.
C. The Argument that There Is Another Alternative to Perfectionism
To be fair to Sunstein, there is another way that minimalism is supposed
to defeat fundamentalism, one which is invulnerable to the criticisms put
forward thus far.
One of the strongest arguments in favor of
fundamentalism, one might think, is that its only serious alternative is
perfectionism, and that perfectionism is unacceptable. Rather than taking
fundamentalism's inadequacy to be the ground for perfectionism, this
argument-the one Sunstein is targeting-takes the inadequacy of
perfectionism to be a ground for fundamentalism. Sunstein's minimalism is
meant as a means of refuting this argument-"hey, there is another way to
reject perfectionism." Historically, of course, there is a great deal to be said
for reading Sunstein this way. The nomination of Robert Bork, then Scalia
and Thomas and the fundamentalist club, was a response to the William
Brennan perfectionist strands of the Warren Court and its continuation
through the Burger Court. Plainly, Sunstein is aiming to support the Sandra
Day O'Connor, David Souter, Anthony Kennedy alternative to this.
What I want to say to this argument is that of course fundamentalism is
not the only response to that sort of perfectionism. There are myriads of
possible responses, of which minimalism is just one. The most salient
alternatives, I believe, are an Ely-based, not a particularly minimalist
process view that also takes stare decisis seriously but is not minimalist
across the board and a form of originalism that is broad and historically
serious and takes stare decisis seriously.
Additionally, minimalism suffers from three kinds of intrinsic problems.
First, as mentioned, it is a theory of methodology and style in adjudication,
not a theory of the substance. Second, where a theory of substance is
available and compelling, it is hard to know why one should be a
minimalist. One must begin with a very robust theory of fallibility, of a sort
that is usually rejected in a variety of other areas of adjudication.

12. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Third, there is a kind of risk aversion built into minimalism that, in other
areas of life and law, is regarded as non-optimal because, while it removes
certain large negatives, it also removes certain large positives. For
example, it is well accepted that we do not want drug companies to be so
risk averse that they decline to produce socially valuable products, such as
childhood vaccines. Just as a very risk averse company might deprive
society of valuable products that it would otherwise develop, so very risk
averse courts will deprive society of valuable decisions. Would Brown v.
Board of Education14 have been decided by judges who took a minimalist
perspective? Chilling inventive activity has large social costs, and the
argument for a norm against risk taking is incomplete without an account of
these costs. I would expect to arrive at a position in the normative theory of
constitutional adjudication that was-like, for example, John Hart Ely'scomplex and nuanced in a manner that included space for a large amount of
risk avoidance by judges (incrementalist and deferential to other branches),
while also recognizing some domains in which bolds steps were warranted
by both the contingencies of history and the special institutional role
filled. 15 Ely aside, it strikes me that this is where we are in constitutional
law and have been for quite a long time, and it is not clear to me that the
activist-tempering proclivities of minimalism relative to this status quo have
been adequately justified.
II. FLEMING'S PERFECTIONISM
This is a good juncture to turn to Fleming's book, for it takes the opposite
position: It counsels greater aggressiveness than, for example, Ely, in a
variety of areas, while in principle agreeing to a mix of judicial stances
depending on subject area and the relative competencies of other branches.
In particular, Fleming is an unapologetic apologist for broad articulation of
fundamental individual rights under the Due Process Clause. One of the
principal claims of the book is that the conservatives need not worry about
"cabining" the range of autonomy-based individual rights.
By
understanding the structure of deliberative autonomy and deliberative
democracy that is laid out by our Constitution, one begins to see that
autonomy is firmly rooted in the constitutional order.
A. The Problem of CabiningAutonomy
I want to put forward two concerns about Fleming's position: one about
his capacity to provide the sort of cabining he wishes, and the other about
his understanding of Dworkinian constitutional theory. First, Fleming's
effort to cabin autonomy is less promising than he claims. There are two
different tasks that he fails to distinguish. One is the task of showing that

14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. See generally John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review
(1980).
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constitutional ideas are secure, that they have a foundation that grounds
them in some sense. A second is the idea that they are limited, controllable,
and cabinable. Fleming's synthesis of Dworkinian jurisprudence, Rawlsian
political theory, and large swaths of constitutional law based in the Bill of
Rights, provides a plausible basis for the first task. Just as Ely, for
example, cashed out the Bill of Rights in terms of a vision of a properly
functioning democracy with robust speech rights and procedural protections
of a sort only a Constitution could provide, so Fleming has offered a
constitutional vision that takes the requirement of deliberation in
lawmaking to support a special, legally entrenched set of constitutional
protections that will provide the possibility of conscientious deliberation at
both the social and the individual level. But the very breadth of the political
theoretic ideals provides reason to be even more skeptical that he will be
unable to carry out the second. And, indeed, the Rawlsian political theory
provides little basis for confidence on the second-cabining autonomy.
In a section of Chapter V entitled, "The Scope of Deliberative
Autonomy: Limited to Significant Basic Liberties,"' 16 Fleming states that
constitutional constructivism's "criterion for specifying the basic liberties in
interpreting the Constitution as a coherent scheme, is in terms of the
significance of such liberties for deliberative autonomy or deliberative
democracy."' 17 He indicates that significance is not a question of the
strength of subjective preferences for such a form of liberty; it is an
objective matter. Moreover, the touchstone of such significance is its being
a thing of equal value to everyone, no matter what their conception of the
good.
Years ago, when I first confronted similar emphases on "significance" in
Fleming's earlier work, I was baffled that he believed such a bland and
wide-open notion could solve the cabining problem. Many people will
plausibly take the liberty position that sexual orientation is significant, and
many will reject this. Many people will take the position that liberty in
deciding whether one's children shall sing Christmas carols at school is
significant, and many will reject this. Many people will think that liberty in
deciding whether one's children are taught evolution is significant, and
many will reject this. Perhaps these examples are not well chosen, but I
have no confidence in the capacity of a notion as vague and toothless as
"significance" to solve any of the cabining or, for that matter, objectivity
and determinacy problems that critics have raised. What I appreciate now
is that the "cabining problem," which I believe is real and remains, goes
hand in hand with a problem of principle. The problem of principle is
figuring out why courts should be empowered to protect any liberty
interests that are unenumerated, and why, if they are empowered to protect
some, they should not be empowered to protect all. Here I think the
constitutional constructivist has an "in theory" answer, even if it is not
16. Fleming, supra note 2, at 109.
17. Id.
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actually very comforting at the level of application. The "in theory" answer
is that it is not about providing constitutional protection for any liberty that
someone feels strongly about; it is about providing protection for a range of
liberties that the state must regard as basic to guaranteeing autonomy for all.
In this sense, Fleming is indeed "securing" autonomy, but I am much less
sure he is cabining it.
B. Dworkin, Fidelity,Perfectionism, and "The Best It Can Be"
As to fidelity, Fleming has a negative point and a positive point. As
before, I agree with one and not the other. The negative point is a critique
of originalists, be they narrow or broad originalists. The point is that the
dead hand of the past argument is correct, not in terms of a
countermajoritarian problem but in terms of a more fundamental
jurisprudential problem. The problem is that the obligation of fidelity to the
Constitution is not properly understood as an obligation to comply with the
set of rules that the ratifiers understood themselves to have been placing in
the Constitution. Fleming and I are willing to grant for the purposes of
argument the possibility of discerning original understanding. But we are
truly unwilling to accept that original understanding captures what the
Constitution means insofar as the Constitution contains rules andprinciples
that we as a people are bound to accept and apply. As Dworkin and
Fleming have put the point, the obligations imposed by the Constitution are
obligations imposed by the Constitution qua charter of norms that we as a
people chose and continue to choose to live under. It is the ongoing mutual
understanding of ourselves as governed by a constitutional system that
comprises the source of bindingness of the Constitution. As I shall indicate
below, it is far from clear that this understanding of what makes the
Constitution binding law provides any basis whatsoever for inferring an
affirmative theory of constitutional meaning. But what it does is displace
an incredibly appealing, but ultimately untenable, theory of what makes the
Constitution binding, and that theory--"ratifiers' command"-is the most
powerful font of an originalist theory of meaning. The point can be put in
terms of fidelity: It is not the case that fidelity to the Constitution is really a
matter of compliance with the commands of the ratifiers, as they expressed
them in the Constitution. On this negative point, which I believe to be of
very great importance, Fleming and I agree.
But then Fleming has a positive point, which is that we ought to interpret
the Constitution so as to make it the best that it can be-so that it deserves
our fidelity. And it is quite clear that Fleming, following Dworkin, intends
by this that we fashion, in constitutional interpretation, the most justifiable
aspirational principles we can while still retaining fit. More particularly,
while Fleming insists on a more careful and coherent lawyering of
constitutional materials than Dworkin does, Fleming follows Dworkin in at
least two further respects, which I might call, provocatively, "the decorative
use of history and tradition," and the "de facto dominance of justification
over fit." And so we end up with an enterprise in political philosophizing
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that produces the framework that is most justifiable, so long as a very thin
and malleable fit constraint is satisfied. It is this conception of fidelity, so
understood, with which I take issue. Of course, it is no accident that
Sunstein's book, and, indeed, his entire minimalist theory, is probably the
most sophisticated and extensive non-originalist attack on this kind of
perfectionistic constitutional theory. Apart from their agreement on results,
on the shortcomings of fundamentalism, and on the need to do some version
of accommodating text, history, and structure (a significant caveat),
Fleming's perfectionism and Sunstein's minimalism are true antagonists of
one another.
C. Fleming v. Harlan
Although my labels for points of disagreement with Fleming may be
unfairly slanted against him, my general point is one that Fleming directly
welcomes, for an important target of his book is Justice John Harlan's
traditionalist vision. Indeed, he expressly and very eloquently addresses
what he regards as a schism between a Constitution of ordered liberty,
running from Justice Benjamin Cardozo's Palko1 8 opinion to Kennedy's
Lawrence1 9 opinion, on the one hand, and a Constitution of ordered liberty
that is rooted in our history and traditions, as conceived by Harlan. Fleming
decidedly comes down against Harlan, reasoning that "Harlan's
understanding of what constitutes tradition was too traditionalist and not
sufficiently aspirational or critical. '20
Fleming's own constitutional
constructivism "would reconstruct Harlan's idea of the rational continuum
of ordered liberty embodied in the common law constitution, using a
constructivist constitution of principle underwritten by a substantive
political theory that best fits and justifies the constitutional document and
underlying constitutional order as a whole." 2 1 Moreover, rather than
looking "to common law principles for the sake of carrying them forward
without offering a substantive account of what our basic liberties are or
what they are for," Fleming would flesh out unenumerated rights by
'22
utilizing the "criterion of significance for deliberative autonomy.
As I understand it, there are three kinds of arguments that Fleming would
run against Harlan. First, traditionalism and historicism often trap us; we
must not be harnessed by history and tradition in such a way that we fail to
root out immoral and unjust practices. This is meant as a point of political
morality and a point of constitutional theory-perhaps even as a point of
constitutional law. Second, even if we are not stuck with or trapped by
historical practices, we should not be constrained by them if such
constraints prevent moral progress, and using history as a touchstone will at

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Fleming, supra note 2, at 118.
Id.
Id. at 119.
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least slow us down or significantly constrain our progress. Third, the
selection of historically accepted principles as authoritative is wrongheaded,
at least where the rationales in deliberative autonomy that provide the
justification for most of our other basic principles would actually cut
against these practices. For it is really the scheme of deliberative autonomy
that is the foundation for our constitutional order.
The first point is that historical practices should not lock out moral
progress in the articulation of constitutional rights; the second point is that
historical practices should not weigh against a liberty-enhancing reading of
the Constitution and thereby slow down progress; the third point is the more
basic underlying importance of deliberative autonomy that grounds our
whole constitutional scheme anyway, and therefore, the historical practice
does not measure up in terms of authority either.
The first, no lock-out point, is probably not a view that Harlan would
have accepted. The idea of a living constitution, or a continuum, or an
organic growth pattern is very different from a lock-out problem. Harlan
clearly thought that change was significant and that the common law
provides a nice baseline, from which we can grow. That is the point of the
"living Constitution" metaphor. Things are different as to the second point,
however; history and tradition are clearly important, albeit in a
nonmeasurable and non-dispositive way. To be sure, if one shares
Fleming's politics, it is disappointing to be slowed down. But one cannot
argue that this undercuts the plausibility of Harlan's approach unless either
(a) the wrongness of having progress slowed down is obviously clear as a
desideratum of a constitutional theory, or (b) there is some jurisprudential
picture that cuts against the "slowing down" tendencies. Although point (a)
is tempting (as in Thomas on the Establishment Clause 23), I think it is
utterly untenable as to the "slowing down" problem. If it is tenable, it is
tenable as to the locking-out change problem, but we see that this is not
Harlan's position.
So I believe we are left with the need for a
jurisprudential argument against the plausibility of a constitutional theory
that permits history and tradition to constrain the kind of progress in the
recognition of rights that occurs through constitutional law. Needless to
say, this is really where Fleming and Sunstein meet. Sunstein's minimalism
is, in certain ways, well designed to take exactly the opposite view.
Fleming's entire theory is set up to respond to the challenge, so put.
D. A Critiqueof Fleming and Dworkin on the Place ofAbstract Theory
I believe the jurisprudential answer Fleming would offer is one and the
same as the third criticism of Harlan: It is the abstract scheme of
deliberative autonomy that is the essence of our constitutional order, and
insofar as the Constitution has authority over us, it is this scheme that has
the authority. To take the particular historical and traditional principles that

23. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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we have recognized at any particular point in time to be the constitutional
law is to make a conceptual and jurisprudential mistake of the kind that
Holmes famously ridiculed in The Path of the Law: 24 A Vermont justice of
the peace dismissed an action brought against a defendant who had broken
the plaintiffs churn because he had found nothing about churns in the
statutes or case law. 25 The point is that one can fail to see what the law
really is by failing to discern what the law is at a sufficiently high level of
generality.
This argument is plainly Dworkinian in its nature: The law just is what it
would be interpreted to be in an interpretation that pushed us as far as we
could be pushed in the direction of understanding our entire legal
framework in a manner that rendered it a coherent, intelligible whole that
enjoyed to the fullest degree a justification that resonated with the legal
materials already extant.
Although I am, broadly speaking, an adherent of Dworkin's
jurisprudential critique of legal positivists generally and of other
constitutional theorists more particularly, I do not believe either Fleming's
or Dworkin's position here is tenable, and I think the mistake points back in
the direction of Harlan. I have time and space for only a brief indication of
why I hold this view.
In an outstanding article published several years ago, Stephen Perry
defended the fundamental role of legal principles in constituting law against
a series of criticisms by Larry Alexander, Ken Kress, and others. 26 Perry's
point was helpfully set forth by way of contrasting two different phases in
Ronald Dworkin's jurisprudential writing: an early, Model of Rules phase
found in the first half of Taking Rights Seriously,27 and a later Law's

Empire phase. 28 In the first phase, Dworkin's point in both jurisprudence
and constitutional theory was that the law is constituted, in substantial part,
by principles, and that those principles could not be identified in a way
consistent with H. L. A. Hart's positivism (in jurisprudence) 2 9 or with
naive, putatively morally neutral originalism (in constitutional law), but
required an approach that recognized legal reasoning as pervasively
coherentist and moral in its content. In the second phase, most famously set
out in Law's Empire, Dworkin identified the law with the theoretical
framework that would best fit and justify all of the relevant legal

24. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897).

25. Id. at 474-75.
26. Stephen R. Perry, Two Models of Legal Principles, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 787 (1997).
Stephen Perry's article is, in part, a response to Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal
Principles,in Law and Interpretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy 279 (Andrei Marmor ed.,
1995), reprintedin 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739 (1997). See Perry, supra,at 815-19.
27. See generally Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 14
(1967), reprinted as revised, Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules I, in Taking Rights
Seriously 14 (1977).
28. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986).
29. See generally H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961).
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materials. 30 And of course that theoretical framework would be rich with
principles, the most justifiable principles that would carry the large,
Herculean burden of fit and justification. Perry argued not only that these
two views were not identical, but also that the first one was immune to
many of the criticisms that had been leveled against the second. 3 1
Although I cannot defend the point fully here, I would argue that the
fundamental place of principles in the law and the obligation of judges to
identify and to apply those principles does not, in and of itself, entail the
judicial obligation or even the judicial prerogative to rejigger those
principles so as to conform the law more perfectly to the abstract theoretical
framework that one views as most effectively justifying those principles.
Indeed, although Dworkin is right to deny the possibility of a value-free,
pedigree-based approach to identifying the legal principles that are binding
in the law, he moves too quickly to the idea that the adjudicative enterprise
properly involves selection of moral principles that the judge regards as
having a powerful justification and a plausible connection to extant legal
materials. And, more pointedly, I do not think that Dworkin's argument
that the abstract framework really is the law is adequately defended. Often,
it is justifiable or appropriate for a judge to dig beneath a medium-level
principle in order to resolve a close question or to figure out how the law
should be extended. But the appropriateness of sometimes going deeper
does not yield the conclusion that what is deeper really is the law.
Let us now turn back to Fleming's critique of Harlan. His most
important criticism, in my view, is that a judge ought to go beneath the
historically and traditionally held practices and principles, and probe toward
the abstract framework of principle from which our historically and
traditionally recognized common law rights emerge. I think that Fleming
may often be correct about this. But the appropriateness of doing so does
not, on my view, emerge from the fact that the abstract constitutional
constructivist framework is the constitutional law (rather than the particular
common law recognized rights). It is a powerful norm of judicial
methodology in sorting out difficult questions. As such, it is one among
many norms-including those minimalist ones championed by Sunstein.
The common law principles recognize common law rights-these
principles have a claim to being part of our body of constitutional law.
Hence, jurisprudential considerations properly lead us closer to Harlan's
view.
One more word on fidelity. Insofar as judges have an obligation to apply
the law, not their own fantasy (unless they have sufficient reason to believe
the law happens to be identical with their fantasy), what matters is applying
the principles that are part of our body of constitutional law, and this will
sometimes be narrower and more tradition-bound than Fleming would wish.
But it may be that the judicial virtue of fidelity to the Constitution is best
30. See generallyid.
31. See Perry, supra note 26, at 807-15.
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understood in a manner that looks to the underlying scheme of values and
strives to stay true to the scheme of values. On my view, the obligation and
the virtue frequently-perhaps typically-go hand in hand. Where,
however, there is a conflict between them, the obligation applies first, and
an extra argument regarding the appropriateness of the exercise of the
power would be required.
An intended, but, I think, unfortunate,
consequence of Fleming and Dworkin's conception of fidelity is that it
denies the possibility of this sort of conflict, wishing away the reality of
difficult judgments regarding how aggressive one ought to be in pushing
forward to "our highest aspirations."
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONALISM

Reading Sunstein's and Fleming's books has thrown me back into the
world of theories of interpretation, which I first engaged in during the
1980s. Great, playful (and sometimes annoying) deconstructive feats of
imagination constructed upon the head of a pin were popular then, and
occasionally were interjected into legal studies, too. In that spirit, I would
like to suggest that perhaps the key passage in Radicals in Robes is to be
found on page v. Most of you will not even find page v of this book, for it
is not numbered. It is the page that reads simply: "for David A. Strauss."
Strauss is Sunstein's colleague at Chicago, but he is also the figure in
American legal theory most closely associated today with common law
constitutionalism. 32 And so page v naturally leads to the question: Is
Radicals in Robes a Sunsteinian step toward common law
constitutionalism?
Similarly, although it is quite clear that Lawrence v. Texas 33 is, in
important respects, emblematic for Fleming of the right way to think about
unenumerated rights, no one who knows Fleming would think that he
would select Justice Kennedy, the author of Lawrence, as the emblematic
judicial reasoner. And he does not. Perhaps Justice Brennan would be his
choice for this role. But I did not miss that the trajectory of unenumerated
rights thinking that Fleming wants to explore starts with-and indeed the
foundational decision for deliberative autonomy is taken to be-Palko v.
Connecticut.34 Unlike his reference to Lawrence, Fleming's reference to
Palko expressly indicates the Justice who decided it: Justice Cardozo. And
so the foundational opinion regarding deliberative autonomy, for a very
self-conscious Fleming, was a product of the Justice typically considered
our most esteemed common law judge: Benjamin Cardozo.
Together, these two observations raise the possibility that Sunstein and
Fleming are both, at some level, alive to the possibility that common law
constitutionalism is the way to go. Because I am, at the end of the day,
32. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 877 (1996).
33. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
34. 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Fleming, supra note 2, at 112-16.
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anything but a deconstructionist, these playful comments do not in fact go
very far for me. In very deep respects, both Sunstein and Fleming would
seem to reject common law constitutionalism: Sunstein because of his
enthusiasm for leaving law to more politically responsive branches, where
possible; Fleming because of his lack of enthusiasm regarding the supposed
virtues of incrementalism; both because of their distrust of taking too
seriously historically entrenched baselines.
On the other hand, perhaps common law constitutionalism would provide
us with a middle path. Ironically, it would provide a greater possibility of
improving on tradition than Sunstein's own minimalism, for while the
common law is by nature precedent-based, prudent, and cautious, it is not
invariably so. The common law contains a wide range of doctrines about
when change is appropriate and why; the disposition of courts to dig deep
and make big changes is limited by these doctrines and principles regarding
their institutional competency, but not ruled out in any blanket manner, as it
is by minimalism. Moreover, judges operating in a common law tradition
have a self-conception regarding domains of fallibility, and the degrees of
minimalism are tied to that self-conception. Finally, the common law
constitutionalism rests on a conception of what makes the law binding that
is neither as history-bound as that of the fundamentalists nor as unrooted
and nearly question begging as that of the perfectionists. While it is true
that a great deal of constitutional law concerns the powers and duties of
branches and states, not of private persons, that is just to say that the subject
matter of constitutional law is different than that of subjects such as torts,
contract, or property. A common law constitutionalism, such as ours, itself
contains principles regarding the superior institutional competency of the
legislature, for example, regarding various issues.
The written nature of our Constitution has always been the largest
obstacle to a common law constitutionalist theory, but this concern rests
upon a confusion between a striking, but fallacious conceptual point, and a
subtler but more genuinely difficult point of constitutional theory. The
striking and fallacious conceptual point is that the whole idea of a written
constitution is that it, rather than the decisions made by the courts, is the
law that governs. This is fallacious because it presupposes an exclusive
dichotomy between text and decisions made by courts. Of course,
throughout statutory law-and even more notably in contract law-courts
are busy articulating rules, reasons, and decisions in a manner that selfconsciously and carefully builds upon and applies the text. Like contract
law, constitutional law is a form of common law, much of whose substance
requires interweaving and interpreting texts.
There is a much more difficult and softer objection which is that courts,
even if they end up making the law in some sense, are bound to give a
special role to the text in constitutional law because our system selfconsciously decided to be one with a written constitution, not simply judgemade law. And so, in effect, the whole style of judicial decision making in
constitutional law must be of a different type-far more like applying a
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statute than like fashioning rules of liability in torts. This concern is well
taken, but does not undercut the very idea of common law
constitutionalism.
In fact, it is, itself, a piece of common law
constitutionalism, just as the parol evidence rule in contract law is a piece
of the common law of contracts. To be sure, the problems of constitutional
decision making in many-perhaps nearly all-domains are deeply
connected to the constitutional text, and this presents both a source of
substance and an array of constraints that are central to the adjudicative
process. But the application of constitutional law is best understood as the
application of a common law of the Constitution, most or all of which
places the written constitution in a central place, not as the application of a
document, which, lamentably, must be mediated by courts.
Finally, a common law constitutionalism that took Harlan's
traditionalism seriously is surely something Fleming rejects. But perhaps
he should not. Fleming's claim to cabin autonomy was not sustained, I
argued; common law constitutionalism that took history seriously would do
a better job, while not ruling out the possibility of moral progress, and while
still instantiating the same values. Of course, Fleming also rejects the
built-in modesty of the common law constitutionalist, but I think we may
ask-with Sunstein-whether this is a wise or prudent agenda. Sunstein's
book is, beneath the surface, motivated in part by the idea that
perfectionism of a sort that bridles at Burkean prudence is a large part of
what got us where we are today, on the verge of being dominated by
fundamentalists. In my view, minimalism is overcorrection. But a
common law constitutionalism-in addition to providing a very plausible
jurisprudential position-may find the sweet spot pragmatically, too.

